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ABSTRACT	
The	expansion	of	state-funded	Muslim	schools	in	Britain	since	1998	has	developed	against	a	
backdrop	of	sustained	public	political	rhetoric	around	the	wider	position	of	British	Muslims	in	
both	political	and	educational	contexts.	This	article	explores	the	public	policy	rhetoric	around	
Muslim	 schools	 under	 New	 Labour	 and	 the	 subsequent	 Coalition	 and	 Conservative	
governments	and	compares	how	these	narratives	align	with	outcomes	in	terms	of	numbers	
of,	and	types	of,	denominational	Muslim	faith	schools	in	Britain.	The	article	applies	a	Critical	
Race	 Theory	 approach	 based	 on	 the	 construction	 of	 counter-narrative	 through	 a	 critical	
analysis	 of	 policy	 and	 its	 outcomes.	 This	 analysis	 is	 contextualised	 through	 exploring	 the	
implications	 of	 counter-terror	 strategies	 such	 as	 Prevent	 for	 the	 political	 and	 educational	
equity	of	British	Muslims	as	stakeholders	in	the	state.	Against	this	context	the	article	explores	
the	 extent	 to	 which	 successive	 policy	 frameworks	 and	 political	 narratives	 around	 faith	
schooling	have	played	out	in	terms	of	denominational	state-funded	Muslim	schools.	Whilst	
gains	 have	 been	made	 under	 New	 Labour	 and	 the	 successive	 Coalition	 and	 Conservative	
governments,	 critical	 analysis	 reveals	 that	 public	 policy	 narratives	 allow	 for	 a	 misleading	
account	of	the	extent	to	which	Muslim	communities	have	been	enfranchised	through	state	
funding	for	Islamic	schools.	
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Critical	Race	Theory,	policy	rhetoric	and	outcomes:	the	
case	of	Muslim	schools	in	Britain	
	
	
Introduction	
This	article	aims	to	critically	consider	the	extent	to	which	policy	narratives	around	Muslim	
schools	under	both	New	Labour	(1997–2010)	and	the	more	recent	Coalition	(2010–15)	and	
Conservative	 (2015-date)	governments	 line	up	with	outcomes	 in	 terms	of	 the	numbers	of	
Muslim	schools	that	have	been	granted	state	funding	since	1998.	The	article	aims	to	explore	
some	of	 the	 implications	of	 the	role	of	Muslim	schools	 in	 the	political	enfranchisement	of	
British	Muslim	communities.	It	is	argued	that	Islamic	schools	represent	a	key	site	for	British	
Muslims	 to	 acquire	 political	 equity	 in	 a	wider	 climate	 that	 embodies,	 to	 varying	 degrees,	
Islamophobic	 discourses.	 The	 representation	 of	 Islamic	 schools	 in	 the	 independent	 sector	
demonstrates	that	slow	progress	in	terms	of	numbers	of	state-funded	Muslim	schools	is	not	
due	to	a	lack	of	demand	for	such	schools	among	Muslim	communities.	It	also	logically	follows	
that	the	independent	sector	represents	fertile	ground	in	terms	of	the	potential	numbers	of	
Muslim	schools	that	could	be	brought	into	partnerships	with	the	state.	Various	mechanisms	
around	faith	schooling	have	existed	in	England	and	Wales	since	1944.	An	important	part	of	
the	argument	presented	here	will	be	informed	by	the	ways	in	which	these	frameworks	have	
been	used	by	Muslim	communities	in	recent	years	and	the	wider	societal	implications	around	
the	‘types’	of	schools	that	each	of	these	mechanisms	results	in.	Some	key	aims	inform	the	
overall	 narrative	 of	 this	 piece.	 Initially	 the	 article	 is	 concerned	 with	 exploring	 what	 an	
intersectional	Critical	Race	Theory	(CRT)/Islamophobia	analysis	can	tell	us	about	the	state	of	
political	enfranchisement	for	British	Muslims	in	contemporary	contexts.	In	addition	to	this,	
the	article	will	also	explore	the	extent	to	which	state-funded	Muslim	schools	represent	a	site	
for	increasing	political	equity	for	British	Muslims	in	the	form	of	partnerships	with	the	state.	
Finally,	I	will	explore	the	power	dynamics	manifested	in	these	partnerships	and	the	potential	
implications	for	British	Muslim	communities.	
	
Establishing	 boundaries	 for	 the	 enquiry	 –	 Critical	 Race	 Theory	 and	 its	
application	in	this	enquiry	
This	article	 is	 focused	on	applying	a	CRT	analysis	of	 the	disparity	between	 (a)	educational	
policy	rhetoric	around	faith	schooling	generally	and	Muslim	schools	specifically	since	1997,	
and	 (b)	 outcomes	 in	 terms	 of	 numbers	 of	 state-funded	Muslim	 schools	 and	 the	 kinds	 of	
partnerships	with	the	state	that	have	been	manifested	through	them.	One	process	which	is	
not	assumed	here	is	the	conflation	of	religion	with	‘race’.	It	is	fully	acknowledged	here	that,	
whilst	there	are	large	minority	ethnic	groups	who	are	Muslim	such	as	British	Pakistanis	and	
Bangladeshis,	 Muslim	 communities	 in	 Britain	 are	 also	 characterised	 by	 extensive	 ethnic	
diversity	(Tinker	2009).	It	is	also	acknowledged	that	there	are	bodies	of	work	(see	Allen	2010;	
Sayyid	2010)	which	critically	challenge	notions	of	Islamophobia	that	have	been	used	in	public	
documents	such	as	the	Runnymede	Trust’s	Islamophobia	–	a	challenge	for	us	all	(1997).	The	
conceptual	tensions	that	might	exist	around	applying	CRT	to	Muslim	communities	in	Britain,	
and	also	the	ways	in	which	this	ties	into	what	we	understand	as	Islamophobia,	sit	at	the	centre	
of	 other	 emerging	work	 by	 this	 author.	 For	 the	 purposes	 of	 this	 article,	 the	 rationale	 for	
applying	CRT	when	 looking	 at	 state-funded	Muslim	 schools	 in	Britain	will	 be	based	on	 an	
exploration	of	anti-Muslim	sentiment	in	the	public	space	and	the	implications	of	this	for	the	
political	equity	of	British	Muslims	as	stakeholders	in	both	education	and	the	state.	
	
CRT	is	a	theory	of	‘race’	which	has	its	origins	in	the	work	of	critical	legal	scholars	in	the	USA		
(Crenshaw	2002;	Crenshaw	et	al.	1995).	As	a	theory	of	‘race’,	CRT	is	fundamentally	concerned	
with	the	systematic	marginalisation	of	racialised	minorities	in	contemporary	social	contexts.	
There	are	several	key	tenets	of	CRT	which	include	Critical	Whiteness	Studies,	master	narrative	
and	counter-narrative,	interest	convergence	and	an	emphasis	on	the	centrality	of	‘voice’	in	
qualitative	accounts	of	racism	in	contemporary	contexts.	There	is	not	the	scope	to	explore	all	
of	these	aspects	of	CRT	in	detail	in	this	article.	For	the	purposes	of	the	enquiry	here	the	article	
will	substantively	focus	on	master	narrative	and	counter-narrative	in	the	case	of	state-funded	
Muslim	schools	in	Britain.	One	of	the	central	themes	in	established	work	on	CRT	has	been	on	
the	ways	in	which	policy	functions	to	sustain	‘race’	inequalities	across	education	(see	Gillborn	
2005,	2008).	To	 this	end	 the	enquiry	here	 is	 informed	by	a	critical	 consideration	of	public	
policy	and	rhetoric	around	 faith	schooling	since	1997	with	a	view	to	comparing	narratives	
around	Muslim	schools	in	the	political	and	public	space	with	outcomes.	A	recurring	theme	in	
emerging	CRT	 scholarship	 focused	on	policy	 analysis	 has	been	 the	 argument	 that	 societal	
structures	ensure	that	‘racial’	inequity	is	sustained	at	the	biting	point	of	tolerable	discomfort	
for	marginalised	racialised	minorities.	This	article	will	ultimately	argue	that	there	has	been	a	
disconnect	between	public	narratives	around	Muslim	schools	and	real	outcomes	in	the	form	
of	numbers.	Therefore,	access	to	state-funded	Muslim	schools	remains	largely	exclusive	for	
the	vast	majority	of	British	Muslims.	These	outcomes	sit	against	a	backdrop	of	policy	rhetoric	
which	acknowledges	the	tendency	for	faith	schools	to	perform	strongly	in	educational	league	
tables.	
	
On	the	surface,	applying	a	theory	of	‘race’	to	look	at	issues	around	religion	might	seem	at	best	
restrictive	 and	 at	 worst	 problematic.	 The	 safest	 option	might	 be	 to	 simply	 focus	 on	 one	
particular	ethnic	group	within	the	wider	religious	community	of	British	Muslims.	In	many	ways	
this	would	be	completely	unproblematic,	particularly	 if	 the	analysis	 retained	a	clear	set	of	
boundaries	around	how	far	arguments	might	be	applicable	in	terms	of	clearly	identified	ethnic	
groups.	However,	using	CRT	in	this	constrained	way	raises	issues	around	power,	knowledge	
and	the	purpose	of	CRT	as	an	emancipatory	framework	focused	on	revealing	the	fullest	extent	
to	which	‘racial’	inequalities	are	manifested	in	contemporary	social	contexts.	Applying	CRT	in	
the	analysis	of	only	certain	Muslim	communities	could	arguably	contribute	to	power	dynamics	
around	 knowledge	 and	 the	purpose	of	 knowledge	which	 reinforce	 a	 ‘divide	 and	 conquer’	
effect.	There	are	some	 important	arguments	around	master	narratives,	counter-narratives	
and	the	purpose	of	CRT	which	will	need	to	be	considered	in	order	to	fully	demonstrate	this	
point,	and	they	will	be	explored	in	greater	detail	later	in	this	article.	It	is	important	that	the	
premises	 for	 the	 application	 of	 CRT	 to	Muslims	 as	 a	 religious	 community	 are	 effectively	
established	by	exploring	the	ways	in	which	British	Muslims	are	systematically	racialised	in	the	
public	sphere.	
	
Islamophobia?	
The	 foundation	 for	 establishing	 a	 convincing	 case	 for	 applying	 Critical	 Race	 Theory	 in	 the	
analysis	of	Muslim	communities	can	be	established	through	considering	the	ways	in	which	
Muslims	have	been		marginalised	as	a	religious	group.	Once	we	establish	the	forms	in	which	
this	takes	we	can	set	out	the	premises	for	identifying	the	particular	dynamics	of	discrimination	
faced	by	Muslims.	Existing	bodies	of	work	on	Islamophobia	have	consistently	demonstrated	
the	ways	in	which	Muslims	have	received	sustained	negative	media	attention,	particularly	in	
the	 years	 following	 11	 September	 2001	 and	 the	 London	 bombings	 of	 2005.	 It	 is	 fully	
acknowledged	here	that	there	is	much	critical	discussion	around	Islamophobia	and	what	it	
means	 at	 the	 conceptual	 level.	 There	 is	 not	 the	 scope	 to	 substantively	 replicate	 these	
arguments	 in	 their	 entirety	 here.	 However	 there	 are	 some	 key	 points	 in	 these	 emergent	
discussions	on	Islamophobia	that	can	be	explored	further	for	the	purpose	of	the	argument	
here.	Initially,	we	do	need	to	consider	what	‘Islamophobia’	might	refer	to,	and	how	we	might	
initially	identify	the	phenomena	as	it	is	articulated	and	manifested	in	the	public	sphere.	As	
part	of	a	far	more	critical	exploration	of	Islamophobia	at	the	conceptual	level,	Allen	(2010)	
argues	that	a	distinct	‘Muslim’	or	‘Islamic’	identifier	or	identification	process	would	appear	to	
be	 an	 essential	 feature	 (Allen	 2010,	 62).	 Allen’s	 identification	 of	 this	 ‘initial	 identification	
process’	is	part	of	a	wider	critique	of	notions	of	Islamophobia	that	had	been	used	in	the	public	
space,	most	notably	within	the	seminal	Runnymede	report	Islamophobia	–	a	challenge	for	us	
all	(1997).	The	report	identified	Islamophobia	as	being	manifested	in	three	‘closed	views’	of	
Islam.	The	 first	of	 these	closed	views	 is	 the	perception	of	 Islam	as	being	 seen	as	a	 ‘single	
monolithic	 bloc,	 static	 and	 unresponsive	 to	 new	 realities’	 (Runnymede	 1997,	 5).	 The	
overtones	here	are	twofold.	Firstly,	Islam	is	presented	as	homogenous	rather	than	diverse.	
Secondly,	 it	 is	 suggested	 that	Muslim	communities	are	unresponsive	 to	change.	 If	Muslim	
communities	are	perceived	of	as	being	unresponsive	to	change,	then	the	implication	here	is	
that	 the	 scope	 for	 resolving	 any	 perceived	 conflicts	 is	minimal.	 This	 first	 interpretation	 is	
closely	related	to	a	second	‘closed’	perspective	which	identifies	Islam	as	separate	and	‘other’,	
with	aims	and	values	being	posited	in	opposition	to	and	resistant	of	the	influence	of	other	
cultures	(Runnymede	1997,	5).	Allen	critiques	the	use	of	these	closed	views	arguing	that	they	
suggest	 a	 homogenised	 notion	 of	 Islamophobia	 which	 does	 not	 effectively	 allow	 for	 the	
inclusion	 of	 the	 many	 nuanced	 and	 varied	 ways	 in	 which	 anti-Muslim	 and	 anti-Islamic	
phenomena	might	occur	(Allen	2010,	55).	Thus,	if	we	are	confined	to	identifying	Islamophobia	
by	 the	 reference	 points	 in	 the	 Runnymede	 report,	 much	 anti-Islamic	 or	 anti-Muslim	
phenomena	are	likely	to	fall	under	the	radar.		
	
If	we	draw	on	this	critique	as	a	descriptive	process	it	is	easy	to	see	parallels	with	the	ways	in	
which	racism	is	discussed	in	Critical	Race	Theory.	A	key	tenet	of	Critical	Race	Theory	is	the	
notion	of	racism	as	becoming	less	explicit,	more	nuanced	and	subtle	and	thus	largely	evading	
identification	in	the	white	experience	of	master	narratives.	An	interesting	explanation	around	
the	ways	in	which	this	impacts	specifically	for	Muslim	communities	is	offered	by	Sian	(2015).	
She	argues	that	the	racialisation	of	Muslims	occurs	in	the	context	of	the	dismissal	of	racism	
and	 its	 critique	 in	general	 society	 (Sian	2015,	196,	197).	 This	 conviction	 is	 consistent	with	
wider	CRT	narratives	which	identify	the	power	of	racism	in	contemporary	contexts	as	coming	
from	the	ways	in	which	it	evades	identification	as	a	result	of	the	wider	societal	adherence	to	
post-racial	logics.	Furthermore,	we	can	also	identify	the	Runnymede	report	as	a	political	piece	
of	 apparatus	 that	 actually	 facilitates	 anti-Muslim	 and	 anti-Islamic	 ‘phenomena’	 whilst	
purporting	to	do	the	exact	opposite.	Of	central	relevance	here	is	the	work	of	S.	Sayyid	who	
raises	the	question	of	whether	Islamophobia	is	closer	to	‘anti-semitism’	or	‘racism’	(Sayyid	
2010).	He	offers	a	comprehensive	discussion	which	draws	a	series	of	comparisons	between	
these	 phenomena.	 Constraints	 do	 not	 allow	 for	 the	 replication	 of	 this	 discussion	 here,	
however	key	comparisons	include	differential	public	perceptions	between	Islamophobia	and	
anti-semitism.	For	example,	Sayyid	argues	that	anti-semitism	is	accepted	as	an	unprovoked	
phenomena,	whereas	‘some	Muslims	are	accused	of	contributing	to	Islamophobia’.	Muslims	
are	differentiated	into	groups	identified	as	‘good’	and	‘bad’	(Sayyid	2010,	11).	This	also	spills	
over	into	differential	expectations	for	Muslims	to	provide	public	statements	of	regret	around	
violent	conflicts	that	may	happen	across	religious	lines	(Sayyid	2010,	11).		
	
Similarly,	Sayyid	argues	that	Islamophobia	does	not	necessarily	fit	with,	what	he	identifies	as,	
a	Eurocentric	conception	of	racism	that	requires	the	presence	of	racists	(Sayyid	2010,	12).	It	
is	this	critical	turn	that	serves	as	a	key	step	here	towards	integrating	Islamophobia	with	CRT.	
Whilst	 not	 exclusively	 the	 case,	 racism	 within	 a	 CRT	 framework	 certainly	 includes	 the	
acknowledgement	of	 racist	outcomes	without	 the	necessary	presence	of	active	 racists.	As	
noted	above,	a	key	part	of	the	CRT	argument	is	that	racism	has	become	so	nuanced	that	it	
evades	 detection	 in	 mainstream	 society.	 This	 argument	 relies	 on	 the	 premise	 that	 racist	
outcomes	are	not	necessarily	exclusively	the	result	of	the	behaviours	of	active	‘racists’.	Thus,	
whilst	Islamophobia	might	not	fit	with	the	‘Eurocentric	concept	of	racism’	as	it	is	identified	by	
Sayyid,	the	more	nuanced	model	of	racism	at	the	centre	of	much	CRT	enquiry	might	share	
some	fundamental	consistencies	with	Islamophobia.	Sayyid	argues	that	racialised	bodies	have	
never	been	exclusively	biological,	rather	they	emerged	alongside	the	identification	of	religion,	
culture,	 history	 and	 territories	which	were	 used	 to	 group	 fabricated	 distinctions	 between	
‘Europeanness’	 and	 ‘non-Europeanness’	 (Sayyid	 2010,	 13).	 For	 Sayyid,	 Islamophobia	 can	
arguably	be	defined	as	the	disciplining	of	Muslims	by	reference	to	an	antagonistic	‘Western’	
horizon	 (Sayyid	 2010,	 15).	 For	 the	 purposes	 of	 the	 article	 we	 can	 identify	 that,	 whilst	
Islamophobia	is	nuanced	and	complex,	at	its	core	it	implicates	the	presence	of	a	wider	anti-
Islamic	phenomena	which	positions	Muslims	as	‘non-European’	in	European	public	political	
settings.	The	article	will	now	move	on	to	consider	some	of	the	wider	implications	here	for	the	
political	 enfranchisement	 of	 British	 Muslims	 in	 the	 public	 space	 more	 generally,	 before	
focusing	 on	 the	 state	 of	 educational	 enfranchisement	 through	 the	 development	 of	 state-
funded	Muslim	schools	more	specifically.	
	
Prevent	–	implications	for	political	and	educational	equity	
One	 of	 the	 mechanisms	 through	 which	 Muslims	 have	 been	 displaced	 as	 stakeholders	 in	
mainstream	 political	 equity	 is	 through	 the	 residual	 effects	 of	 counter-terror	 strategies.	
Kundnani	(2009)	argues	that	the	logic	of	the	‘Prevent’	branch	of	the	counter-terrorist	strategy	
in	Britain	has	been	counter-productive,	and	actually	serves	to	perpetuate	tensions	between	
British	Muslim	communities	and	the	state.	The	Prevent	strategy	was	launched	in	2007	as	part	
of	 the	 British	 government’s	 wider	 counter-terrorism	 strategy	 and	 has	 been	 focused	 on	 a	
‘community-led’	approach	to	preventing	violent	extremism	(Kundnani	2009).	The	rationale	
for	Prevent	was	to	‘win	over	hearts	and	minds’	of	young	Muslims	in	Britain	and	to	lead	them	
away	from	extremist	narratives	(Kundnani	2009,	10).	At	the	early	stages,	the	strategy	involved	
the	allocation	of	funding	to	local	authorities	for	the	purpose	of	targeted	capacity	building	of	
Muslim	communities	particularly	focused	on	young	people,	women	and	Mosques	(Kundnani	
2009,	 10).	 Central	 to	 the	 Prevent	 agenda	 has	 been	 the	 promotion	 of	 shared	 values	 to	
challenge	extremist	 ideologies	and	strengthening	the	role	of	faith	 institutions	within	those	
communities.	These	developments	have	led	to	a	focus	on	education	standards	in	general	and	
citizenship	education	specifically	in	after-school	supplementary	provision	offered	in	Mosques,	
Madrassas	and	Muslim	community	organisations	(Thomas	2009,	284).	However,	the	‘Muslim-
centred’	 focus	 within	 strategies	 like	 Prevent	 functions	 as	 something	 of	 a	 self-defeating	
contradiction,	 given	 the	 evidence	 that	 indicates	 that	wider	 segregation	 across	 ethnic	 and	
religious	lines	has	been	the	context	within	which	radicalisation	has	occurred,	at	least	in	the	
British	context	(Thomas	2009,	285).	Even	if	we	were	to	ignore	this	contradiction,	Kundnani	
argues	that	serious	problems	arise	when	deprived	communities	in	need	of	support	consider	
that	their	voluntary	sector	organisation	can	only	access	resources	to	meet	their	needs	if	they	
are	willing	to	sign	up	to	a	counter-terrorism	agenda	(Kundnani	2009,	10).	Furthermore,	the	
allocation	of	 funding	within	this	Muslim-specific	approach	has	the	potential	 to	 fuel	White,	
working-class	resentment,	whilst	leaving	some	Muslims	feeling	that	they	have	been	targeted	
as	a	result	of	broad,	negative	generalisations	about	their	communities	(Thomas	2009,	285,	
286).	But	 there	are	wider	 issues	here	with	 the	ways	 in	which	 funding	has	been	allocated.	
Rather	 than	 distributing	 economic	 resources	 based	 on	 need,	 funding	 for	 2008–2011	was	
allocated	across	cities	proportionate	to	the	size	of	their	Muslim	communities	(Kundnani	2009,	
13).	Allocating	funds	in	this	way	reveals	a	wider	discursive	set	of	assumptions	about	‘need’	
relative	to	the	scale	of	a	Muslim	presence	in	a	particular	space.	Invariably,	this	demonstrates	
one	of	the	ways	in	which	the	Prevent	strategy	has	been	informed	by	a	myriad	of	Islamophobic	
logics	whereby	young	Muslims	are	subject	to	various	forms	of	racialised	governmentality	(Sian	
2015,	197).	
	
There	is	a	more	pervasive	effect	of	counter-terror	strategies	for	Muslims	as	communities	in	
European	settings	at	a	time	where	public	political	interests	are	characterised	by	the	‘war	on	
terror’.	For	example,	Fekete	argues	that	the	culmination	of	European	security	strategies	and	
counter-terrorist	policies	which	have	emerged	out	of	public	and	media	narratives	around	the	
‘war	on	terror’	represent	a	structured	anti-Muslim	racism	(Fekete	2004).	According	to	Fekete,	
these	security	strategies	‘lump	together	genuine	political	dissidents	and	numbers	of	ordinary	
Muslims	with	individuals	whom	most	would	regard	as	terrorists,	thus	obfuscating	rather	than	
clarifying	 any	 possible	 genuine	 threat’	 (Fekete	 2004,	 9).	 Fekete’s	 concept	 of	 anti-Muslim	
racism	goes	beyond	simply	 identifying	 that	Muslims	experience	 racialisation	as	a	 result	of	
political	narratives	around	the	‘war	on	terror’.	Rather,	anti-Muslim	racism	is	organised	and	
operates	discursively.	Fekete	argues	that	intelligence	services,	police	and	the	media	work	in	
conjunction	with	a	political	agenda	centred	around	eliciting	public	 consent	 to	 surveillance	
through	the	evocation	of	fear,	to	create	a	culture	of	suspicion	against	Muslims	(Fekete	2004,	
14).	 This	 culminates	 in	 Muslims	 being	 identified	 as	 and	 policed	 as	 a	 suspect	 community	
(Fekete	2004,	10).		
	
There	are	some	interesting	implications	of	the	point	raised	by	Fekete,	particularly	regarding	
ordinary	political	dissidents.	Counter-terrorism	policies	and	security	strategies	have	resulted	
in	environments	whereby	the	political	voices	of	young	Muslims	are	subject	to	a	dual	process	
of	scrutiny	and	displacement	from	mainstream	democratic	discussion.	For	example,	part	of	
the	process	of	identifying	radicalisation	necessitates	an	evaluation	of	an	individual’s	political	
orientation.	 Counter-terrorist	 strategies	 provide	 a	 normative	 base	 from	 which	 these	
judgements	 are	made,	 and	 therefore	 British	Muslims	who	 are	 particularly	 outspoken	 and	
oppose	the	involvement	of	European	nation	states	in	conflicts	in	Islamic	countries	become	at	
risk	of	being	labelled	as	‘radical’.	Conversely,	the	exact	same	argument	could	be	articulated	
by	a	non-Muslim	individual	without	carrying	any	risk	of	being	labelled	in	the	same	way.	It	is	
also	important	to	consider	here	that,	within	the	UK	context,	wider	public	policy	documents	
consistently	 avoid	 applying	 the	 term	 ‘violent	 extremism’	 to	 any	other	 ethnic,	 or	 religious,	
group	(Thomas	2009,	284).	The	Muslim-centred	focus	within	Prevent	in	particular	results	in	
an	 agenda	 which	 claims	 even-handedness,	 but	 allows	 the	 continuing	 development	 of	
organisations	 like	 the	 British	 National	 Party	 (Thomas	 2009,	 286)	 and	 the	 English	 Defence	
League.	These	kinds	of	public	narratives	result	in	Muslim	political	voices	being	subjected	to	a	
filtration	 process	which	 has	 the	 power	 to	 displace	 particular	 political	 interests	 outside	 of	
mainstream	 democratic	 discussion.	 The	 inability	 for	 counter-terrorism	 strategies	 to	
effectively	 differentiate	 Muslim	 political	 dissidents	 indicates	 that	 these	 strategies	
homogenise	Muslims	based	on	the	kind	of	‘closed	views’	of	Islam	identified	by	Runnymede	in	
1997.	 Inevitably,	 for	Muslims,	engaging	 in	political	democratic	debates	becomes	weighted	
with	risk	and	suspicion.	In	line	with	Fekete’s	argument,	this	constitutes	a	discursive	process	
whereby	the	legitimacy	of	political	voices	is	determined	based	on	an	individual’s	identity	as	
being	either	Muslim	or	non-Muslim.	
	
As	 noted	 above,	 such	 counter-terror	 strategies	 have	massive	 implications	 for	 the	political	
marginalisation	 of	 British	 Muslim	 voices	 owing	 to	 the	 risk	 of	 conflating	 Muslim	 political	
dissidents	with	Islamic	extremists.	However,	the	political	marginalisation	of	British	Muslims	
also	 happens	 at	 a	 far	more	 subtle	 level	 and	 this	 is	 inherently	 embedded	 in	 conventional	
notions	of	‘race’	which	exclude	religious	identity	as	a	legitimate	facet.	As	argued	by	Meer	&	
Modood,	 ‘while	 curbs	 on	 the	 defamation	 of	 conventionally	 conceived	 ethnic	 and	 racial	
minorities	might	be	seen	as	progressive,	the	mocking	of	Muslims	is	seen	to	constitute	healthy	
intellectual	debate’	(Meer	and	Modood	2009,	348).	Thus,	although	we	have	established	that	
religious	identity	is	no	more	chosen	than	prescribed	racial	categories	for	those	who	are	born	
into	a	Muslim	families,	Muslims	as	a	minority	group	are	not	afforded	the	same	protections	
against	anti-Islamic	sentiment	that	other	racialised	groups	are	against	racism.	This	sidelining	
of	Muslim	interests	can	be	explained	as	a	direct	effect	of	a	dominant	public	perception	which	
sees	 Muslims	 as	 a	 threat	 rather	 than	 a	 disadvantaged	 minority	 subject	 to	 increasingly	
pernicious	discourses	of	racialisation	(Meer	and	Modood	2009,	354).	Whilst	the	kinds	of	anti-
Muslim	sentiment	outlined	by	Meer	&	Modood	may	have	their	roots	in	notions	of	cultural	
racism,	 anti-Muslim	 sentiment	 also	 has	 fundamental	 implications	 for	 the	 political	
disenfranchisement	of	British	Muslims.	Anti-Muslim	racism	may	well	have	its	roots	in	notions	
of	cultural	racism	centred	around	identifying	‘good’	and	‘bad’	South	Asians	as	identified	by	
Modood	 (2005)	 and	 Hussain	 and	 Bagguley	 (2012),	 but	 the	 racialisation	 process	 is	 farther	
reaching	and	impacts	across	the	political	struggle	between	Muslims	and	the	state	that	are	
borne	out	of	counter-terror	strategies	like	Prevent.	
	
The	discussion	above	is	not	only	relevant	to	debates	about	the	wider	impact	of	counter-terror	
strategies	on	political	equity	and	the	differential	legitimacy	afforded	to	voices	of	dissent	in	
democratic	politics.	 The	Prevent	 strategy	and	 its	appendages	 (most	 recently	 the	 statutory	
duty	 for	 schools	 to	 prevent	 violent	 extremism)	manifest	 a	 bridging	 gap	 between	 political	
equity	and	education	 indicating	a	wider	 culture	of	 surveillance	around	Muslim	children	 in	
schools.	This	is	bound	into	wider	public	narratives	around	the	conflating	of	increased	Islamic	
influence	 with	 legitimate	 threat.	 This	 binary	 reading	 of	 the	 Islamic	 in	 the	 public	 space	
completely	overlooks	one	of	the	key	functions	of	Muslim	schools	as	identified	in	the	voices	of	
stakeholders	 in	 Islamic	 schools	 in	Meer’s	 research	 (2009).	Meer	 cites	 Abdullah	 Trevathan	
(head	 of	 the	 Islamia	 school	 in	 Brent)	 as	 explicitly	 stating	 in	 an	 interview	 that	 part	 of	 the	
purpose	of	Muslim	schools	is	to	create	an	emerging	British	Muslim	culture,	rather	than	the	
conservation	 of	 any	 pre-existing	 culture	 (Meer	 2009,	 383).	 In	 this	 particular	 instance,	 the	
increased	presence	of	the	Islamic	 in	the	public	sphere	that	necessarily	comes	with	Muslim	
schools	 equates	with	 negotiating	 a	 space	 affording	 educational	 and	 civic	 gains	 for	 British	
Muslims.	
	
Muslim	schools	in	England	and	Wales	
Muslim	 schools	 have	 been	 present	 in	 England	 and	Wales	 since	 1979	 (Dooley	 1991).	 It	 is	
important	to	establish	here	that,	whilst	many	Muslim	children	receive	supplementary	Islamic	
education	 through	 the	 provision	 of	 Madrassas	 in	 community	 Mosques,	 this	 paper	 is	
concerned	 with	 those	 institutions	 which	 are	 registered	 as	 Muslim	 schools	 either	 in	 the	
independent	or	state-maintained	sector	in	England	and	Wales.	Within	the	frameworks	around	
state-maintained	 education,	 particular	 types	 of	 schools	 are	 able	 to	 identify	 as	 having	 a	
‘distinctive	religious	character’.	There	are	two	important	timeframes	to	consider	here	with	
regard	 to	 policy	 structures	 and	 faith	 schooling.	 The	 first	 state-maintained	Muslim	 schools	
were	established	in	England	and	Wales	in	1998,	and	so	it	logically	follows	that	our	starting		
point	should	be	to	explore	the	frameworks	in	place	at	that	time.	The	notion	of	a	‘distinctive	
religious	character’	was	first	 introduced	under	New	Labour	with	the	School	Standards	and	
Framework	Act	(UK	Parliament	1998).	Under	the	Act,	voluntary-aided	schools	are	permitted	
to	 identify	 themselves	 as	 having	 a	 ‘distinctive	 religious	 character’	 whilst	 providing	
denominational	Religious	Education	(RE)	in	line	with	their	religious	character.	Arrangements	
for	 funding	 represent	an	 important	distinguishing	 feature	of	voluntary-aided	schools,	with	
costs	 for	 individual	 institutions	 being	met	 by	 both	 the	 state	 and	 a	 religious	 organisation	
affiliated	with	a	given	school.	The	proportion	of	cost	to	be	covered	by	each	party	has	changed	
over	time,	but	in	the	period	between	1998	and	2010	voluntary-aided	schools	would	receive	
up	to	90%	of	their	funding	from	the	state	with	the	outstanding	10%	being	met	by	an	affiliated	
religious	 organisation	 (DfES	 2002)	 such	 as	 a	 Church,	Mosque	 or	 Synagogue.	 Independent	
schools	are	able	to	register	a	distinctive	religious	character	under	the	Designation	of	Schools	
Having	a	Religious	Character	(Independent	Schools)	(England)	Order	2003.	The	next	section	
will	consider	the	developments	around	Muslim	schools	under	the	frameworks	around	faith	
schooling	under	the	Labour	government	between	1998	and	2010	in	further	detail.	We	will	
then	move	on	to	outline	how	structures	around	faith	schooling	changed	under	the	Coalition	
government	of	2010–15.	
	
New	Labour:	a	sustained	interest	in	state-funded	minority	religious	schooling?	
Within	the	last	30	years	there	have	been	a	series	of	changes	in	the	policy	frameworks	around	
state	provision	for	faith	schooling	that	have	impacted	on	Muslim	schools.	The	1993	Education	
Act	 first	 introduced	frameworks	which	would	allow	 independent	 faith	schools	to	apply	 for	
funding	 directly	 through	 central	 government.	 Under	 these	 frameworks,	 regulation	 of	 the	
school	would	also	come	directly	 from	central	government	 rather	 than	 the	 local	education	
authority.	This	process	would	position	independent	faith	schools	successful	in	securing	grant-
maintained	 status	 outside	 of	 any	 local	 communities	 of	 voluntary-aided	 faith	 schools.	
However,	 it	would	 nevertheless	 provide	 an	 effective	mechanism	 for	 two	Muslim	 schools,	
Islamia	Primary	and	Al-Furqan,	to	successfully	be	the	first	to	secure	state	funding	in	England	
and	Wales	(Tinker	2009,	540).	These	two	schools	inevitably	transitioned	into	the	voluntary-
aided	sector	following	the	phasing	out	of	grant-maintained	status	in	1999.	It	is	worth	noting	
here	that	 these	 initial	advances	were	made	under	 the	New	Labour	government	elected	 in	
1997.	The	sustained	interest	in	faith	schooling	and	the	emphasis	on	encouraging	independent	
minority	faith	schools	to	enter	the	state	sector	represented	a	recurring	theme	within	New	
Labour’s	wider	‘education,	education,	education’	(Coughlan	2007)	mandate.	
	
The	 apparent	 interest	 in	 funding	 minority	 religious	 schools	 more	 generally,	 and	 Muslim	
schools	specifically,	was	manifested	in	a	series	of	parliamentary	papers	and	public	documents	
under	 New	 Labour.	 For	 example,	 the	 2001	 Green	 Paper	 Schools	 building	 on	 success	
emphasised	that	faith	schools	appear	to	perform	well	when	compared	to	non-denominational	
schools,	and	subsequently	proposed	expanding	faith-schooling	within	the	state	sector	(DfEE	
2001).	 In	 2005,	 the	 White	 Paper	 Higher	 standards,	 better	 schools	 for	 all	 continued	 this	
narrative	 by	 further	 encouraging	 independent	 schools	 to	 join	 the	 state	 sector,	 with	 a	
particular	emphasis	on	encouraging	Muslim	schools	to	apply	for	voluntary-aided	status	(UK	
Government	 2005).	 Furthermore,	 in	 September	 2007	 the	 government,	 along	 with	
representatives	of	major	faith	groups,	released	the	document	Faith	in	the	system.	The	paper	
‘unveiled	a	joint	declaration	and	shared	vision	of	schools	with	a	religious	character	in	twenty-
first	 century	 England’,	 stating	 that	 the	 government	 recognises	 the	 aspirations	 of	 faith	
communities	to	secure	more	schools	to	offer	education	in	accordance	with	the	tenets	of	their	
faith	(DCSF	2007,	4).	Faith	in	the	system	again	placed	a	particular	emphasis	on	encouraging	
minority	religious	schools	to	apply	for	state	funding,	stating	that	there	are	
	
15,000	Muslim	children	and	around	11,000	Jewish	children,	including	those	from	low-
income	families,	whose	parents	chose	to	send	them	to	 independent	schools	with	a	
particular	 religious	 character	 and	 that	 the	 availability	 of	 places	 in	 the	maintained	
sector	 could	 therefore	 provide	 an	 important	 contribution	 to	 integration	 and	
empowerment	of	these	communities.	(DCSF	2007,	18).		
	
Under	the	Labour	government	the	number	of	voluntary-aided	Muslim	schools	in	England	and	
Wales	rose	steadily	and	currently	stands	at	12,	a	figure	which	has	not	changed	since	2010	
(Breen	 2013).	 New	 Labour’s	 sustained	 policy	 narratives	 around	 encouraging	 the	
establishment	 and	 subsequent	 expansion	 of	 state-funded	 Muslim	 schools	 invariably	
culminated	in	real	and	objective	economic	gains	for	British	Muslim	communities.	
	
Anxiety	following	2010?	
The	arrival	of	the	Coalition	government	in	2010	and	subsequent	Conservative	government	in	
2015	 has	 provided	 for	 a	 confused	 picture	 regarding	 the	 government’s	 position	 on	 faith	
schools.	The	political	landscape	since	2010	has	been	complex,	with	a	series	of	developments	
leaving	 the	 future	of	minority	 faith	 schooling	open	 to	question.	Almost	 immediately	 after	
securing	office	as	Prime	Minister	David	Cameron	declared	 that	 ‘state	multiculturalism	has	
failed’	(Helm,	Taylor,	and	Davis	2011),	a	statement	that	necessarily	brings	into	question	the	
issue	 of	whether	 or	 not	 the	 state	will	 continue	 to	 encourage	 faith	 schooling	 for	minority	
communities.	However,	the	wider	implications	of	the	change	in	government	in	2010	for	state-
funded	faith	schools	generally,	and	Muslim	schools	specifically,	are	far	from	clear.	One	key	
development	 in	 education	 policy	 came	 with	 the	 Academies	 Act	 of	 2010	 which	 laid	 the	
foundation	for	the	widespread	‘conversion’	of	state	schools	to	academy	status,	including	vast	
swathes	of	voluntary-aided	schools.	The	Academies	Act	also	set	out	the	frameworks	around	
‘free	 schools’	 which	 can	 be	 established	 to	 serve	 the	 interests	 of	 local	 communities	 (UK	
Parliament	2010).	Thus,	at	least	in	theory,	the	frameworks	around	free	schools	might	provide	
opportunities	for	Muslim	communities	to	found	Islamic	schools	and	secure	state	funding	for	
them,	even	in	the	light	of	Cameron’s	apparent	convictions	around	multiculturalism.	
	
It	is	worth	noting	here	that	David	Cameron	used	the	term	‘state	multiculturalism’,	implying	
that	 it	 is	multiculturalism	 as	 an	 institutionalised	 strategy,	 advocated	 in	 the	 Swann	Report	
(1985),	that	has	failed.	As	an	institutional	strategy	‘state	multiculturalism’	has	been	criticised	
for	lacking	clear	guidelines	and	national	leadership	(Parekh	2000),	and	consequently	failing	to	
effectively	 embody	 the	 conceptual	 premises	 of	 ‘multiculturalism’	 as	 a	 conceptual	 tool	 for	
challenging	 ‘race’	 inequality	 (see	 Meer	 and	 Modood	 2009;	 Modood	 1994,	 1998,	 2008;	
Modood	 and	 Werbner	 1997).	 However,	 the	 declaration	 that	 multiculturalism	 has	 failed	
represents	 only	 one	 example	 of	 the	 wider	 revival	 of	 assimilationist	 discourses	 around	
education	following	the	events	of	11	September	2001,	the	2001	riots	in	the	North	of	England	
and	 the	 London	 bombings	 of	 7	 July	 2005	 (Sian	 2015,	 183).	 Evidence	 of	 the	 revival	 of	
assimilationist	 discourses	 around	 education	 has	 most	 recently	 been	 revealed	 with	 the	
anxieties	around	the	Trojan	Horse	 letter	 in	Birmingham.	Whilst	raising	some	concerns,	 Ian	
Kershaw’s	investigation	into	the	Trojan	Horse	letter	ultimately	concluded	that	there	was	not	
evidence	to	suggest	there	was	‘a	systematic	plot	to	take	over	schools’	(Kershaw	2014,	8).	The	
details	around	Trojan	horse	are	complex	and	there	is	neither	the	scale	or	scope	to	explore	
these	in	depth	here.	However,	subsequent	public	debates	around	Trojan	horse	did	further	
demonstrate	the	presence	of	wider	anxieties	around	the	Islamic	as	representing	a	threat	to	
British	values	 in	 the	public	sphere.	Such	concerns	about	 increased	 Islamic	 influence	 in	 the	
education	 sector	 might	 be	 more	 about	 Muslim	 schools	 representing	 an	 anathema	 to	
assimilation	rather	than	any	real	‘risks’.	The	above	discussion	necessarily	raises	questions	as	
to	what	the	future	might	look	like	for	Muslim	schooling	in	the	state	sector.	Short	of	halting	
the	expansion	of	state	Muslim	schools	specifically,	it	would	appear	that	the	Academies	Act	
may	serve	as	a	strategy	for	facilitating	more	Muslim	schools,	but	only	on	the	condition	that,	
in	the	event	of	any	issues,	all	responsibility	is	devolved	to	individual	institutions.		
	
In	addition	to	the	developments	above,	the	future	of	state-funded	Muslim	schools	also	comes	
into	question	when	considering	the	wider	economic	conditions	that	have	dominated	political	
debates	around	public	spending	following	the	onset	of	the	recession	in	2008.	In	particular,	
the	Coalition	and	subsequent	Conservative	governments	both	placed	economic	recovery	at	
the	centre	with	widespread	 implications	for	cuts	 in	public	spending.	Following	the	general	
election	of	 2010,	 the	Coalition	 government’s	 primary	 strategy	 for	 economic	 recovery	was	
most	notably	manifested	in	a	series	of	‘austerity	measures’	which	have	been	carried	over	with	
the	election	of	a	Conservative	majority	government	in	2015.	Political	and	economic	conditions	
since	2010	represent	something	of	a	U-turn	in	 levels	of	state	support	for	the	expansion	of	
Muslim	 schools	 in	 the	 state	 sector.	 The	 question	 around	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 Muslim	
communities	will	 be	 able	 to	 continue	 to	make	 gains	 through	 quantifiable	 outcomes	 is	 of	
central	relevance.	However,	recent	economic	and	political	events	have	also	impacted	on	faith	
schools	in	far	more	nuanced	ways.	The	advent	of	the	Academies	Act	in	2010	has	posed	existing	
voluntary-aided	schools	with	the	dilemma	of	weighing	up	the	opportunity	cost	of	retaining	
their	 existing	 status	 in	 a	 competitive	 and	 transformative	 education	 market	 against	 the	
possible	benefits	of	 converting	 to	academy	status	 (Meer	and	Breen	 forthcoming).	Existing	
figures	 demonstrate	 that	 this	 dilemma	 is	 impacting	 on	 voluntary-aided	 schools	 with	 33%	
converting	to	academy	status	by	2013	(Bolton	2013,	4).	Breaking	these	figures	down	across	
denominations	reveals	that	Church	of	England	(C	of	E)	schools	appear	to	be	most	active	in	
converting	to	academy	status	with	41%	of	C	of	E	voluntary-aided	schools	having	done	so	by	
2013	compared	with	25%	of	Roman	Catholic	schools	(Bolton	2013,	4).	Such	transformative	
trends	within	the	maintained	sector	are	 likely	to	result	 in	new	challenges	for	both	existing	
state-funded	Muslim	schools	and	stakeholders	in	Muslim	communities	looking	to	make	future	
gains	in	denominational	schooling.	
	
Numbers	of	British	Muslim	schools	
In	order	to	gain	an	accurate	picture	of	how	Muslim	schools	have	been	positioned	under	the	
Coalition	 and	 subsequent	 Conservative	 governments,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 establish	 how	 far	
Muslim	communities	have	been	enfranchised	 through	 state	 funding	 for	 Islamic	 schools	 to	
date.	Furthermore,	it	is	crucially	important	to	consider	the	ways	in	which	any	gains	have	been	
made	and	the	nature	of	the	partnerships	that	they	represent.	The	discussion	in	the	previous	
subsection	 might	 appear	 to	 champion	 multiculturalism	 due	 to	 ways	 in	 which	 state-
multiculturalism	 has	 informed	 outcomes	 in	 terms	 of	 enfranchising	 Muslim	 communities	
through	state	funding	for	Islamic	schools.	It	is	important	to	note	here	that	the	establishment	
of	 state-funded	 Muslim	 schools	 under	 New	 Labour	 did	 represent	 a	 watershed	 in	 the	
educational	enfranchisement	of	British	Muslims.	Particularly,	 the	establishment	of	Muslim	
voluntary-aided	 schools	 represents	 a	 critical	 step	 in	 bringing	 Muslim	 communities	 into	
partnerships	with	the	state	(Meer	2007,	67,	68).	However,	it	is	an	understanding	of	both	how	
gains	have	been	made	prior	to	2010	and	also	the	implications	for	future	partnerships	with	the	
state	after	2010	that	position	this	work	firmly	within	a	Critical	Race	Theory	Framework.	
	
The	development	of	 voluntary-aided	Muslim	schools	arguably	 represents	 the	 clearest	and	
most	tangible	example	of	educational	enfranchisement	for	religious	Muslims.	Whilst	this	is	
significant,	in	reality	only	limited	numbers	of	independent	Muslim	schools	have	successfully	
made	the	transition	into	the	voluntary-aided	sector.	As	noted	above,	the	central	relevance	of	
Critical	Race	Theory	here	is	most	clearly	established	through	understanding	two	key	factors	
that	need	to	be	considered	chronologically	in	order	to	avoid	confusion.	Firstly,	the	conditions	
around	 the	 initial	 establishment	 of	 state-funded	Muslim	 schools	 between	 1998	 and	 2010	
need	to	be	explored.	Secondly,	we	need	to	consider	what	the	landscape	looks	like	following	
the	Academies	Act	of	2010	and	the	implications	of	current	political	conditions	for	the	future	
of	state-funded	Islamic	schooling.	If	we	focus	initially	on	developments	prior	to	the	advent	of	
the	Academies	Act	2010,	we	can	establish	how	far	Muslim	communities	were	enfranchised	
under	New	Labour	relative	to	other	religious	groups.	In	2009	there	were	approximately	7000	
voluntary-aided	schools	in	England	with	the	vast	majority	being	Church	of	England	(C	of	E)	or	
Roman	Catholic	 (Tinker	2009,	540).	Within	 this	number,	53	voluntary-aided	 schools	had	a	
distinctive	religious	character	other	than	C	of	E	or	Roman	Catholic	(Tinker	2009,	540).	Breaking	
these	schools	down	across	 religious	character	 reveals	 that	 those	53	schools	 comprised	37	
Jewish,	2	Sikh,	1	Greek	Orthodox,	1	Seventh	Day	Adventist	(Tinker	2009,	540),	and	12	Muslim	
(Breen	2009,	111).	By	way	of	comparison,	the	vast	majority	of	Muslim	schools	(approximately	
120	at	the	same	point	in	time)	lie	within	the	independent	sector	(Breen	2013,	42).	As	noted	
above,	the	establishment	of	state-funded	Muslim	schools	in	England	and	Wales	represents	a	
significant	 step	 forwards	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 educational	 enfranchisement	 of	 British	Muslims.	
However,	 comparing	 outcomes	 in	 this	 way	 reveals	 that,	 although	 tangible	 gains	 can	 be	
identified	with	the	establishment	of	12	Muslim	schools	in	the	voluntary-aided	sector	by	2009,	
10	times	this	number	were	residing	in	the	independent	sector	(Breen	2013,	42).	Thus,	the	vast	
majority	of	British	Muslims	attending	Islamic	schools	were	doing	so	outside	of	any	partnership	
with	the	state.	
	
Whilst	 the	 above	 starts	 to	 reveal	 just	 how	 few	 British	 Muslims	 have	 had	 the	 benefit	 of	
attending	 a	 voluntary-aided	 Muslim	 school,	 a	 crucially	 important	 point	 needs	 to	 be	
acknowledged	 here.	 Numbers	 of	 Muslim	 schools	 within	 the	 independent	 sector	 have	 a	
tendency	to	fluctuate	for	two	main	reasons.	Firstly,	independent	Muslim	schools	face	ongoing	
financial	instability	in	the	struggle	to	economically	sustain	themselves	(see	Breen	2009,	2013,	
2014).	Within	these	contexts	the	threat	of	closure	is	a	constant	risk	and	some	schools	will	be	
unsuccessful	 in	finding	economic	sustainability.	Secondly,	numbers	of	 independent	Muslim	
schools	necessarily	change	as	and	when	any	such	schools	enter	the	state	sector.	These	two	
factors	have	informed	the	ways	in	which	numbers	of	independent	Muslim	schools	have	been	
discussed	 in	 England	 and	 Wales.	 Consequently,	 between	 2009	 and	 2013	 numbers	 of	
independent	Muslim	schools	were	estimated	at	approximately	120	(2015).	Increased	access	
to	publicly	available	data	indicates	that	numbers	of	Muslim	schools	in	the	independent	sector	
appear	to	be	growing	with	current	numbers	totalling	158	(AMS	data	as	of	October	2014).	In	
the	wake	of	acknowledging	the	difficulties	around	identifying	exact	numbers	of	independent	
Muslim	schools,	it	is	still	clear	that	the	proportion	of	Muslim	schools	which	have	successfully	
entered	the	state	sector	is	small.	Even	based	on	an	approximation,	it	can	still	be	safely	argued	
that	 the	representation	of	Muslim	schools	 in	 the	 independent	sector	prior	 to	2010	was	at	
least	tenfold	that	represented	in	the	state	sector.	
	
The	trend	with	Muslim	schools	outlined	above	becomes	particularly	interesting	if	we	compare	
numbers	of	Church	of	England	and	Roman	Catholic	schools	across	 independent	and	state-
maintained	sectors.	Within	 the	 independent	 sector	 there	are	currently	564	C	of	E	 schools	
(CofE	2013)	and	146	Catholic	schools	(CES	2012)	compared	with	4800	C	of	E	schools	(Chadwick	
2012)	and	2166	Catholic	schools	(CES	2012)	in	the	state-maintained	sector.	Therefore,	 it	 is	
clear	that	proportional	representation	across	sectors	appears	to	be	inverted	when	comparing	
state-funded	 Christian	 and	 Muslim	 provision.	 Clearly,	 educational	 provision	 for	 Christian	
schools	is	predominantly	provided	for	within	the	state	sector,	whereas	provision	for	Muslim	
schooling	 is	 predominantly	 provided	 for	 within	 the	 independent	 sector.	 It	 might	 not	 be	
realistic	to	expect	to	see	Muslim	communities	having	the	same	proportional	access	within	
each	 sector	 as	 that	 afforded	 to	 Christians.	 Nonetheless,	 drawing	 this	 comparison	
demonstrates	just	how	small	the	gains	for	Muslim	schools	were	between	1998	and	2010.	In	
particular,	given	the	sustained	policy	rhetoric	inviting	Muslim	schools	to	enter	the	state	sector	
under	New	Labour,	it	is	important	to	ask	why	only	12	schools	successfully	made	this	transition	
between	1998	and	2010.	The	success	rate	appears	to	be	quite	low	considering	the	numbers	
of	Muslim	schools	that	are	operating	in	the	independent	sector.	
	
The	misalignment	between	New	Labour’s	sustained	policy	rhetoric	around	Muslim	schools	
and	 the	 outcomes	 that	 British	 Muslims	 have	 subsequently	 acquired	 reflects	 a	 legacy	 of	
struggle	 faced	 by	 independent	 Muslim	 schools	 seeking	 to	 acquire	 state	 funding.	 Whilst	
Muslim	schools	have	been	active	in	the	pursuit	of	state	funding	as	early	as	1983	(see	Tinker	
2009,	540),	 it	 is	1998	before	we	see	 the	 first	 state-funded	Muslim	schools	 in	England	and	
Wales.	 An	 explanation	 for	 this	 is	 offered	by	Walford,	who	 argues	 that	 strict	 financial	 and	
demand-led	criteria	imposed	at	the	time	made	it	difficult	for	evangelical	Christian	schools	and	
Muslim	 schools	 to	 enter	 the	 state	 system	 (Walford	 2003,	 165).	 The	 challenges	 faced	 by	
independent	Muslim	schools	seeking	to	enter	the	state	sector	have	been	well	documented.	
As	noted	earlier	in	this	chapter,	the	Islamia	primary	school	in	Brent	was	the	first	independent	
Muslim	school	to	be	awarded	state	funding	through	grant-maintained	status	in	January	1998	
(Tinker	2009,	540).	The	school	had	initially	started	to	explore	possibilities	around	acquiring	
state	 funding	 in	1983	and	submitted	a	 formal	application	 in	1986	 (Tinker	2009,	540).	This	
application	was	considered	and	rejected	in	1990	as	was	a	follow-up	application	in	1993	(Tinker	
2009,	540).	In	1995	a	final	application	was	made	which	resulted	in	the	school	being	awarded	
grant-maintained	status	in	1998	following	a	15	year	struggle	for	state	funding	(Tinker	2009,	
540).	Al-Furqan,	the	second	school	to	successfully	attain	grant-maintained	status,	fought	a	
four-year	campaign	before	receiving	state	funding	in	September	1998	(Parker-Jenkins,	Hartas,	
and	 Irving	 2005,	 44).	 Similarly,	 Feversham	 College	 in	 Bradford	 initially	 applied	 for	 state	
funding	in	1994,	but	did	not	successfully	enter	the	voluntary-aided	sector	until	six	years	later	
in	2000	(Tinker	2009,	540).	In	the	case	of	Islamia	and	Al-Furqan	the	struggle	for	state	funding	
began	well	before	New	Labour	came	to	power,	and	ended	under	that	government.	However,	
Feversham	College	endured	a	 lengthy	struggle	similar	to	that	of	Al-Furqan,	much	of	which	
took	place	under	New	Labour.	Whilst	 this	 is	only	one	documented	case,	 it	 is	 important	 in	
demonstrating	 that	 acquiring	 state	 funding	 for	Muslim	 schools	 was	 still	 characterised	 by	
struggle	after	the	change	of	government	in	1997.	This	point	is	further	demonstrated	in	the	
low	numbers	of	Muslim	schools	that	successfully	qualified	for	voluntary-aided	status	prior	to	
2010.	Thus,	New	Labour’s	rhetoric	around	inviting	independent	Muslim	schools	to	enter	into	
partnerships	with	the	state	may	have	served	as	a	smokescreen	to	obscure	an	unseen	tacit	
intentionality	focused	on	offering	only	marginal	gains.	From	this	position,	New	Labour	appear	
to	be	progressive,	able	 to	commend	themselves	on	offering	 the	 first	 state-funded	Muslim	
schools,	 whilst	 ensuring	 that	 the	 criteria	 for	 doing	 so	 effectively	 prevents	 widespread	
enfranchisement	for	British	Muslims	
	
Issues	around	faith	schooling	and	Muslim	schools	post-2010	
The	disparity	between	policy	 rhetoric	 and	outcomes	 in	 terms	of	numbers	of	 state-funded	
Muslim	schools	under	New	Labour	played	out	in	the	form	of	marginal	gains	in	the	state	sector	
for	 British	 Muslims.	 However,	 the	 arrival	 of	 the	 Coalition	 government	 in	 2010	 and	 the	
subsequent	Conservative	government	of	2015	represents	something	of	a	game	changer	 in	
terms	of	how	policy	plays	out	for	stakeholders	in	Islamic	schooling.	As	demonstrated	above,	
the	 landscape	 of	 state-funded	 Islamic	 schooling	 between	 1998	 and	 2010	 was	 largely	
characterised	 by	 slow-paced	 and	 hard-fought	 gains	 being	 secured	 through	 the	 voluntary-
aided	system	(Meer	and	Breen,	forthcoming).	Demand	for	Muslim	schools	also	appears	to	be	
on	 the	 increase	with	 numbers	 of	 independent	Muslim	 schools	 seemingly	 rising.	 As	 noted	
above,	 numbers	 of	 independent	 Muslim	 schools	 around	 2009–2013	 were	 estimated	 at	
approximately	120	 (Meer	and	Breen,	 forthcoming).	More	 recent	 figures	place	numbers	of	
independent	Muslim	schools	at	158	(AMS	data	as	of	October	2014).	As	noted	above,	there	
are	some	difficulties	with	establishing	exact	numbers	of	independent	Muslim	schools	due	to	
the	 impact	of	financial	 instability	being	manifested	through	fluctuating	numbers.	Owing	to	
the	difficulties	in	establishing	exact	numbers	in	recent	years,	it	would	be	problematic	to	claim	
objectively	 that	 numbers	 of	 independent	 Muslim	 schools	 have	 risen	 by	 38	 since	 2009.	
However,	 the	 number	 standing	 at	 158	 as	 of	 2014	 certainly	 demonstrates	 that	 Islamic	
schooling	is	in	demand.	Furthermore,	we	can	identify	that	it	is	likely	that	some	growth	has	
taken	place	in	the	independent	sector,	even	if	negating	factors	make	it	difficult	to	quantify	
progress	in	precise	terms.	
	
Alongside	 the	 apparent	 growth	of	Muslim	 schools	 in	 the	 independent	 sector,	 numbers	of	
state-funded	Muslim	schools	have	increased	since	2010	and	at	a	relatively	fast	rate	compared	
with	the	1998–2010	era.	Rather	than	favouring	the	voluntary-aided	sector,	gains	in	terms	of	
state-funded	Muslim	schools	are	now	being	made	most	notably	following	the	shift	in	policy	
manifested	in	the	Academies	Act	2010	(UK	Government	2014).	 In	addition	to	championing	
academies,	the	Academies	Act	(2010)	set	out	the	framework	for	Free	Schools	as	a	mechanism	
for	‘communities	and	faith	groups’	(UK	Government	2014)	to	develop	schools	to	cater	to	local	
needs.	Whilst	the	number	of	voluntary-aided	Muslim	schools	has	remained	at	12	since	2009,	
in	subsequent	years	the	number	of	state-funded	Muslim	schools	in	England	and	Wales	has	
risen	to	21	(AMS	data	as	of	October	2014).	The	most	substantive	gains	since	2010	have	been	
made	 through	 the	 new	 and	 emergent	 frameworks	 around	 free	 schools.	 Currently,	 the	
landscape	of	state-funded	Muslim	schooling	comprises	12	voluntary-aided	schools,	eight	free	
schools	and	one	academy	(AMS	data	as	of	October	2014).	Although	the	number	of	voluntary-
aided	Muslim	schools	has	remained	at	12	since	2009,	 it	 is	 important	to	point	out	that	the	
single	Muslim	academy	was	previously	operational	in	the	voluntary-aided	sector.	This	means	
that	at	some	point	following	the	Academies	Act	(2010)	one	voluntary-aided	Muslim	school	
made	 the	 transition	 to	 academy	 status	 leaving	 11	Muslim	 schools	 in	 the	 voluntary-aided	
sector.	Given	 that	 the	number	 currently	 stands	at	12,	 this	 suggests	 that	one	 independent	
Muslim	school	has	successfully	entered	voluntary-aided	sector	since	2010.	 It	 is	also	worth	
identifying	a	further	point	of	clarity	here,	in	that	many	independent	Muslim	schools	use	the	
term	 ‘academy’	 in	 their	 name.	 However,	 as	 independent	 schools,	 these	 institutions	 are	
entirely	privately	funded	and	are	not	‘academies’	in	terms	of	the	criteria	and	frameworks	set	
out	for	state-maintained	schools	under	the	Academies	Act	2010.	Nevertheless,	the	tendency	
for	 independent	Muslim	schools	to	refer	to	themselves	as	 ‘academies’	may	have	distorted	
public	perceptions	of	how	far	Muslim	communities	have	become	educationally	enfranchised	
since	2010.	
	
Gains	made	in	the	post-2010	era	
As	noted	above,	the	most	notable	gains	that	have	been	made	post-2010	in	terms	of	state-
funded	Muslim	schools	have	taken	place	through	the	frameworks	around	free	schools.	Whilst	
it	 seems	 that	 objective	 economic	 enfranchisement	 has	 been	 on	 the	 rise	 for	 Muslim	
communities	 seeking	 state	 funding	 for	 their	 faith	 schools,	 deconstructing	 the	 structures	
around	free	schools	 reveals	something	of	a	counter-narrative	 in	 the	CRT	sense.	An	overall	
increase	 in	 the	 number	 of	 state-funded	Muslim	 free	 schools	 since	 2010	might	 appear	 to	
demonstrate	 the	 suitability	 of	 the	 Academies	 Act	 as	 a	 strategy	 facilitating	 a	 sustained	
commitment	to	increasing	educational	equity	for	British	Muslims.	However,	the	dynamics	of	
the	relationship	between	local	stakeholders	and	the	state	is	fundamentally	different	to	that	
which	has	been	manifested	in	the	voluntary-aided	Muslim	schools	established	between	1998	
and	2010.	Voluntary-aided	schools	operate	within	local	authority	control.	In	the	pre-2010	era	
this	had	meant	that	state-funded	denominational	faith	schools	within	a	given	local	authority	
effectively	 constituted	 a	 network	 of	 institutions	 working	 in	 direct	 relation	 to	 local	
government.	Whilst	resources	invariably	impact	on	real-life	experiences,	within	this	dynamic	
it	is	at	least	possible	for	the	local	authority	to	work	in	conjunction	with	schools	to	meet	the	
needs	of	local	communities.	The	Academies	Act	(2010)	represents	an	important	watershed	in	
the	erosion	of	the	role	of	government	in	the	maintained	sector.	Free	schools	operate	outside	
of	 local	 authority	 control	 and	 as	 such	 are	 answerable	 only	 to	 central	 government	 as	 do	
academies.	Trends	discussed	above	demonstrate	that	voluntary-aided	schools	are	slowly	but	
surely	 converting	 to	 academy	 status	 and	 so	 the	 role	 of	 local	 government	 in	 educational	
provision	 is	 steadily	 changing.	 Whilst	 these	 developments	 are	 presented	 in	 ways	 which	
highlight	the	‘freedoms’	afforded	by	stepping	out	of	local	government	control,	in	reality	any	
liberation	is	afforded	at	the	cost	of	massively	increased	individual	accountability	for	schools.	
The	 2010	 Act	 arguably	 represents	 the	manifestation	 of	 uber	 neoliberal	 principles	 around	
education	and	 the	shifting	of	accountability	 for	 its	provision	away	 from	 local	government.	
However,	of	 crucial	 importance	here,	 the	nature	of	 the	 relationship	between	 schools	 and	
central	 government	 is	 fundamentally	different	 to	 that	manifested	 in	 a	 system	under	 local	
education	authorities.	In	the	post-2010	era	all	schools	that	convert	or	operate	under	academy	
or	free	school	status	do	so	in	partnership	with	central	government.	From	a	purely	logistical	
standpoint,	this	system	cannot	possibly	offer	the	same	level	of	presence	and	support	that	is	
possible	in	the	partnerships	manifested	in	voluntary-aided	schools.	
	
A	 clear	 example	 of	 this	 can	 be	 seen	with	 the	ways	 in	which	media	 narratives	 have	 been	
constructed	 around	 the	 Al-Madinah	 free	 school	 in	 Derby,	 UK.	 Since	 the	 advent	 of	 the	
Academies	Act	 (2010)	and	 the	Coalition’s	 commitment	 to	advocating	academies	and	 ‘free	
schools’,	 there	 has	 been	 some	 increase	 in	 the	 number	 of	 Muslim	 schools	 in	 the	 state-
maintained	sector.	In	addition	to	the	12	voluntary-aided	Muslim	schools,	there	are	now	eight	
Muslim	free	schools	and	one	Muslim	academy	(AMS	2014).	Since	2010	then	the	total	number	
of	state-funded	Muslim	schools	has	risen	from	12	to	21,	with	the	predominant	gains	being	
made	through	the	mechanism	of	‘free	schooling’.	This	is	consistent	with	the	rhetoric	around	
‘free	schools’	as	mechanisms	for	communities	to	establish	schools	which	suit	their	local	needs	
from	the	ground	up.	However,	whilst	this	has	yielded	gains	for	Muslim	communities,	this	has	
taken	place	against	a	sustained	backdrop	of	public	concern	around	Muslim	free	schools	in	the	
media.	This	is	demonstrated	in	the	case	of	Al-Madinah,	which	has	seen	sustained	negative	
media	attention	as	a	result	of	concern	from	OFSTED,	the	Education	Funding	Agency	(EFA)	and	
the	Department	for	Education	(DfE).	The	Al-Madinah	School	in	Derby	opened	in	September	
2012	as	 the	 first	Muslim	 free	 school	 to	offer	provision	at	nursery,	primary	and	 secondary	
levels.	The	school	was	investigated	for	‘financial	irregularities’	in	August	2013,	and	an	OFSTED	
report	which	 followed	 raised	 further	 concerns	 about	 the	 school	 (BBC	 2013).	Much	media	
speculation	has	been	generated	around	the	nature	of	the	concerns	raised	by	OFSTED,	with	
references	 being	 made	 to	 girls	 being	 made	 to	 wear	 compulsory	 hijabs(headscarves)	 and	
segregated	classes	(BBC	2013).	Whether	these	concerns	are	or	are	not	realised	or	evidenced	
in	the	public	space	remains	to	be	seen.	
	
However,	there	are	two	important	points	which	can	be	raised	when	considering	the	case	of	
Al-Madinah.	The	 first	of	 these	 is	concerned	with	 the	contextual	points	of	 reference	which	
have	 been	 used	 in	 media	 discussions.	 The	 problems	 which	 have	 been	 raised	 have	 been	
consistently	attributed	to	the	school’s	faith	character,	rather	than	its	position	as	a	free	school	
operating	within	new	and	emergent	educational	structures.	At	least	one	other	free	school	has	
also	 faced	 closure	 in	 the	 ‘Discovery’	 school	 in	 Crawley	 (Adams	 2013),	whilst	 funding	was	
pulled	from	the	‘One	in	a	Million’	free	school	in	Bradford	nine	days	before	it	was	due	to	open	
(Beckett	2012).	This	evidence	demonstrates	that	there	have	been	systemic	problems	with	the	
structures	 around	 free	 schools.	 However,	 when	 Al-Madinah	 is	 discussed	 in	 the	 media,	
problems	have	been	primarily	attributed	to	the	school’s	faith	status,	rather	than	the	wider	
systemic	problems	around	free	schools.	A	second	point	which	can	be	raised	with	regard	to	
the	case	of	Al-Madinah	is	that	the	very	occurrence	of	concerns	around	the	functioning	of	the	
school	demonstrates	a	 clear	necessity	 for	greater	dialogue	between	communities	and	 the	
state.	 Communities	may	be	 free	 to	 found	 schools	which	 serve	 local	 needs,	 but	under	 the	
structures	 around	 free	 schools	 they	 are	 also	 positioned	 as	 ultimately	 accountable	 should	
problems	 occur.	 Given	 that	 Muslim	 schools	 have	 largely	 been	 excluded	 from	 the	 state-
maintained	 sector,	 prior	 experience	 and	 expertise	 around	 providing	 mainstream	 faith	
schooling	 is	 not	 likely	 to	 be	 present	within	 communities	 looking	 to	 establish	 Islamic	 free	
schools.	 In	 many	 senses,	 the	 structures	 around	 free	 schooling	 seem	 to	 be	 too	 ‘free’.	
Responsibility	for	any	issues	of	concern	is	instantly	attributed	to	the	school,	rather	than	the	
absence	of	support	and	guidance	from	the	state.	Thus,	whilst	Muslim	communities	might	be	
making	 objective	 gains,	 the	 structures	 around	 free	 schools	 leave	 these	 communities	
vulnerable	 to	 public	 criticism	 and	 Islamophobic	 media	 narratives	 where	 the	 mechanisms	
around	 free	 schooling	 reveal	 themselves	 to	 be	 inadequate.	 Thus,	 such	 mechanisms	 are	
inadequate	for	furthering	the	expansion	of	mainstream,	state-funded	Islamic	schooling	in	a	
way	which	politically	enfranchises	British	Muslims	through	joint-enterprise	partnerships	with	
the	state.	We	may	have	more	state-funded	Muslim	schools,	but	the	nature	of	these	emergent	
partnerships	is	such	that	accountability	is	not	shared	where	these	structures	fail.	But	there	is	
a	 more	 serious	 issue	 here.	 The	 uber-neoliberal	 foundations	 which	 underpin	 free	 schools	
represent	 the	 epitome	 of	 passivity	 to	 Islamophobic	 discourses	 which	 demarcate	 the	
boundaries	 of	 possibilities	 for	 expanding	 mainstream	 British	 Islamic	 schools	 for	 Muslim	
communities.	 It	 is	through	this	passivity,	a	political	act	 in	itself,	that	the	state	has	acted	to	
position	itself	in	opposition	to	the	interests	of	British	Muslims.	
	
In	conclusion:	state-funded	Muslim	schools	as	a	site	for	increasing	educational	
and	political	enfranchisement	for	British	Muslims?	
Two	key	points	are	at	the	centre	of	the	arguments	manifested	in	this	paper.	Firstly,	British	
Muslim	 communities	 exist	 in	 a	 political	 climate	 within	 which	 counter-terror	 strategies	
function	against	a	backdrop	comprised	of	media	narratives	around	the	‘war	on	terror’.	This	
complex	environment	has	significant	implications	for	the	political	equity	available	to	British	
Muslims	as	stakeholders	in	the	state.	Whilst	master	narratives	may	reinforce	the	notion	of	
Britain	as	being	a	political	democracy	which	advocates	freedom	of	speech,	(a	principle	that,	
crucially,	was	at	the	centre	of	media	debates	following	the	Charlie	Hebdo	attacks	in	Paris),	in	
reality	 the	 political	 voices	 of	 Muslims	 are	 constrained.	 Counter-terror	 strategies	 work	 in	
conjunction	with	media	narratives	around	the	‘war	on	terror’	to	ensure	that	being	Muslim	
and	 speaking	out	 against	 the	 state	 carries	with	 it	 the	 risk	of	being	 labelled	as	 a	 threat	 to	
national	 security.	 This	 wider	 climate	 has	 permeated	 education	 through	 particular	
manifestations	of	 the	Prevent	 strategy	which	have	 culminated	 in	 a	 culture	of	 surveillance	
around	Muslim	children	in	education.	These	effects	are	discursive,	in	that	Muslim	interests	
come	to	be	positioned	at	the	margins	of	educational	provision.	One	of	the	ways	that	this	has	
been	manifested	is	through	the	misalignment	between	policy	rhetoric	and	outcomes	in	terms	
of	both	numbers	of	Muslim	schools	and	the	nature	of	the	partnerships	they	embody	with	the	
state.	
	
The	 second	 key	 point	 at	 the	 centre	 of	 the	 argument	 is	 that	 state-funded	Muslim	 schools	
represent	 important	 opportunities	 for	 the	 state	 to	 acknowledge	 and	 redress	 the	 wider	
political	and	educational	inequity	experienced	by	British	Muslims	through	actively	entering	
into	 partnerships	 with	Muslim	 communities.	 Progress	 in	 the	 1998–2010	 period	was	 slow	
enough	to	raise	questions	about	how	far	New	Labour	actually	were	interested	in	increasing	
numbers	 of	 state	Muslim	 schools.	 However,	 for	 those	 that	were	 successful,	 the	 resulting	
voluntary-aided	schools	represented	more	of	a	partnership	between	local	government	and	
communities	 than	those	currently	offered	through	 free	schooling,	and	allowed	 (at	 least	 in	
principle)	 for	 schools	 to	 seek	 support	 and	 guidance	 where	 needed	 as	 part	 of	 a	 localised	
network	of	institutions.	Whilst	numbers	of	Muslim	free	schools	have	increased	in	the	post-
2010	 era,	 state	 involvement	 in	 these	 partnerships	 is	minimal.	 The	 argument	 here	 is	 that	
increasing	the	numbers	of	state-funded	Muslim	schools	at	all	represents	an	important	step	in	
increasing	 the	 educational	 enfranchisement,	 and	 by	 proxy	 the	 political	 equity,	 of	 British	
Muslims.	However,	it	is	important	to	consider	the	power	dynamics	around	responsibility	and	
accountability	manifested	in	the	new	and	emergent	mechanisms	around	free	schools	and	the	
implications	 that	 this	might	 have	 for	Muslim	 communities	 within	 wider	 political	 climates	
characterised	by	anxieties	around	the	‘war	on	terror’.	
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